The crisis of governance in South Sudan cannot be understood without interrogating the evolution of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) from a liberation movement into a dominant political party. While corruption in South Sudan is often discussed in broad and moral terms, a more precise analysis reveals a deeper structural problem, which is the institutionalization of patronage, weak accountability systems, and the fusion of party and state. These dynamics have not only undermined public service delivery but have also entrenched a political economy that rewards loyalty over competence, ultimately contributing to state fragility.
From liberation movement to governing party
The SPLM emerged as the political and military vehicle during the Second Sudanese Civil War, commanding significant legitimacy among South Sudanese communities. The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement marked a turning point, transitioning the SPLM from a guerrilla movement into a governing authority in the then Southern Sudan, and later, following the 2011 referendum, into the ruling party of an independent state.
This transition, however, was not matched by a corresponding transformation in governance structures. Liberation movements are often organized around hierarchy, loyalty, and centralized command. These are traits that can undermine democratic governance if left unaddressed. In South Sudan’s case, these characteristics persisted into the post-independence period, shaping the way institutions were formed and managed.
The fusion of party and state
A central feature of South Sudan’s governance crisis is the blurred line between the SPLM as a political party and the state as a public institution. Rather than serving as a platform for policy competition and ideological direction, the party has increasingly functioned as a gatekeeper for access to state resources. For instance, some party officials (secretaries) go to the Ministry of Finance or the Bank of South Sudan using their official titles but end up pursuing personal interests.
Key organs of the SPLM, such as its Political Bureau, Liberation Council, and National Secretariat, are formally mandated to provide oversight, policy direction, and internal accountability. In practice, however, these structures have struggled to function independently. Decision-making has often been centralized, with limited internal checks, weakening the party’s ability to enforce its own constitutional provisions.
This institutional weakness has enabled a system where political loyalty frequently supersedes formal rules. As a result, public institutions mirror party dynamics, leading to a governance environment where accountability mechanisms are either ineffective or selectively applied.
The institutionalization of corruption
Corruption in South Sudan is not merely the result of individual misconduct. It has become embedded within institutional processes. This phenomenon can be understood through the lens of state capture, where political elites shape policies, institutions, and economic opportunities to serve their interests.
Within the SPLM structure, administrative and financial processes have often lacked transparency and independent oversight. Projects and initiatives, rather than being designed solely for public benefit, may also serve as channels for resource extraction. The absence of robust auditing systems and enforcement mechanisms further entrenches these practices.
Once embedded at the party level, these patterns extend into government institutions. Ministries, agencies, and local administrations frequently replicate similar dynamics, creating a system where corruption is normalized rather than exceptional. Reports and indices by organizations such as Transparency International have consistently ranked South Sudan among the most corrupt countries globally, reinforcing concerns about systemic governance failures.
Patronage, ethnicity, and political loyalty
Another critical dimension of corruption in South Sudan is the role of patronage networks, often intertwined with ethnic and tribal affiliations. In a context where formal institutions are weak, political survival frequently depends on maintaining loyalty through resource distribution.
Appointments to public office may therefore reflect considerations beyond merit, including personal relationships, political allegiance, and ethnic balancing. While such practices are not unique to South Sudan, their scale and institutionalization have significant consequences. Nowadays, appointment or removal of undersecretaries is politicized to the extent that a new graduate or a graduate with five years’ experience is appointed to the post of the undersecretary, and such appointments do not conform to the Civil Service Act, 2011, and therefore paralyze the performance in the public institutions.
One of the challenges is the method of acquisition of a party’s membership; sometimes, party membership is acquired through ethnic or clan connections and not through the appropriate procedures stipulated in the SPLM Constitution. Assignment of cadres to the government institutions is now through tribal associations and not through the party nomination, and this has paralyzed the party and has made the SPLM Chairman abandon the SPLM Constitution.
Considering the lack of accountability in the SPLM, there is no hope that South Sudan will prosper but will only witness disaster after disaster. Our current situation portrays that South Sudan is likely to collapse like Somalia in 1991 or Yemen. Features of collapsed/failed states are now visible in the Judiciary, State Legal Administrations (Public Prosecution Attorneys), and within police forces, as bribery is now considered a normal practice. The ruling party (SPLM) is to blame for all these.
The SPLM has undermined the professionalism of the public service, as positions are filled based on loyalty or by inheritance rather than competence. Second, it has deepened social divisions by reinforcing perceptions of exclusion and favoritism. Third, it has weakened institutional accountability, as officials may feel more answerable to their patrons than to the public or the law.
The problem of capacity and meritocracy
As mentioned earlier, the reason for having key independent party organs is to preclude micromanagement and mismanagement of the party through personality cult. However, in most of the decisions taken by the SPLM, it appears that the SPLM chairman is now using those organs as his walking stick, and therefore, the violation of the SPLM Constitution goes unquestioned, and this compromises accountability. Most of the SPLM officials do not entertain criticism, and this has become a norm within the party. If a member violates the rules and such a member has access to a senior member or is a relative to a senior member within the party, such a member escapes disciplinary procedures.
The issue of ‘mismatch of qualifications’ in public appointments reflects a broader challenge of building a competent state apparatus. Following decades of conflict, South Sudan possessed a limited pool of trained professionals, making capacity constraints a genuine concern. However, the persistence of patronage-based appointments has compounded this challenge. Most officials or secretaries assigned by the SPLM leadership to the posts of national or state secretaries are those who failed in their careers in their professions, and they use the SPLM as a shield for their failure. The assignment of those who failed in their careers or professions to head different departments or secretariats has precluded the competent cadres and possibly weakened the party.
Government is now affected by the mismatch of qualifications, and this mismatch was first planted in the party and harvested by the government. A meritocratic system requires transparent recruitment processes, clear performance standards, and protection from political interference, but such a system cannot be ascertained at the moment. In the absence of these safeguards, even capable individuals may be sidelined, while underqualified personnel assume critical roles. This not only affects service delivery but also erodes public trust in state institutions.
Beyond corruption: Structural drivers of state fragility
While the role of the SPLM is central, it is important to situate corruption within a broader set of structural challenges. South Sudan’s economy is heavily dependent on oil revenues, creating a rent-seeking environment where control over resources becomes a primary political objective. This dynamic reduces incentives for taxation and accountability, as the state relies less on citizen contributions.
Additionally, the outbreak of conflict in 2013 further destabilized institutions, diverting accountability and undermining governance reforms. The militarization of politics has reinforced hierarchical decision-making and limited space for dissent, both within the party and the state.
These factors highlight that corruption in South Sudan is not solely a product of individual or party behavior but is embedded within a complex political economy shaped by history, conflict, and resource dependence.
The governance crisis in South Sudan reflects a complex interplay between party dynamics, institutional weaknesses, and broader structural factors. The transformation of the SPLM from a liberation movement into a ruling party was not accompanied by the institutional reforms necessary for effective governance. As a result, patterns of patronage, weak accountability, and centralized control have become entrenched, contributing to systemic corruption.
Yet, the situation is not irreversible. By addressing the underlying drivers of corruption (within both the party and the state), South Sudan has the potential to chart a different path. This will require political will, institutional reform, and sustained engagement from both the government and party.
Way forward: Rethinking accountability and reform
Addressing corruption in South Sudan requires more than rhetorical commitment. It demands structural reforms that tackle the root causes of governance failure. For the SPLM, this begins with internal transformation. Strengthening party institutions, enforcing constitutional provisions, and promoting internal democracy are critical steps toward restoring credibility.
At the state level, independent oversight bodies must be empowered to investigate and prosecute corruption without political interference. Judicial independence, in particular, is essential for ensuring that accountability mechanisms function effectively.
Rebuilding the civil service is equally important. Establishing merit-based recruitment systems, investing in training, and protecting professionals from political pressure can help restore institutional capacity. Over time, this can contribute to improved service delivery in key sectors such as health, education, and infrastructure.
The writer is an Advocate & Commissioner for Oaths based in Juba. He holds an LLM (Public International Law) from Kampala International University, and an LLM and LLB from the University of Juba. He can be reached via choldenga@yahoo.com.
The views expressed in ‘opinion’ articles published by Radio Tamazuj are solely those of the writer. The veracity of any claims made is the responsibility of the author, not Radio Tamazuj.
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