Opinion| Re-engineering a radical constitutional redesign and structure for South Sudan

1. Executive Summary

Beyond the immediate constitutional crisis, the delayed 2026 elections, and the Tumaini Initiative, South Sudan is grappling with a complex web of intersecting crises. As of mid-2026, the country is facing severe structural, economic, health, humanitarian, and geopolitical challenges that require urgent attention.

To replace the hyper-centralized, decree-based system currently dominated by the Presidency and armed elites, South Sudan requires a radical constitutional redesign. The current structure, a winner-takes-all presidential system combined with elite military power-sharing, is mathematically designed to produce dictatorship and conflict.

To cure the disease of Big Man politics, the most possible and sustainable system for South Sudan is to strip the central executive of its unchecked powers, eliminate the financial incentives for armed rebellion, and structurally devolve authority. This paper provides a comprehensive blueprint for the system required to replace the current rotten structure in three phases.

2.    PHASE 1: The Transition Mechanism (How to get there)

Before a new system can be built, the current one must be safely decommissioned. The RTGoNU cannot be trusted to build a state that limits its own power.

1. The Technocratic Caretaker Government: Upon the expiration of the RTGoNU’s mandate (due to its failure to hold elections), it must be replaced by a Caretaker Administration.
2. The Exclusion Principle: This interim government must be composed entirely of non-partisan professionals, civil servants, and judges. No current executive politician or military faction leader may serve in it.
3. The State-Building Mandate: The Caretaker Government will have a strict, non-renewable mandate (e.g., 24 to 30 months) to complete the exact prerequisites the current regime abandoned: conducting the National Population Census, finalizing the Permanent Constitution, and organizing credible elections.

3.    PHASE 2: The Permanent Constitutional Structure (The New Republic)

Once the transition is stabilized, the Permanent Constitution should establish a Decentralized Parliamentary Federal Republic.

3.1.                  Shifting from Presidential to Parliamentary Governance: The root of South Sudan’s problem is the concentration of power in a single President who rules by decree.

1. The Solution: Adopt a Parliamentary System. The Head of Government (Prime Minister) would be elected by the parliament, not in a polarizing nationwide winner-takes-all tribal headcount.
2. Accountability: The Prime Minister and the Cabinet can be removed at any time through a Vote of No Confidence by the parliament. This permanently eliminates rule by decree, as the executive survives only with the continuous consent of the legislature.
3. The Head of State: A ceremonial President (chosen by a two-thirds majority of the legislature) would serve as a symbol of national unity, holding no executive power, but possessing the authority to refer unconstitutional bills to the Supreme Court.

3.2.                  Radical Devolution: The Tri-Provincial Federal Model: The current system of 10+ states is a bloated patronage network designed to be weak and entirely dependent on Juba for funding.

1. The Solution: Revert to the three economically viable, historical provinces: Equatoria, Upper Nile, and Bahr El Ghazal.
2. Provincial Sovereignty: These three provinces would have their own elected parliaments, premiers, and supreme courts.
3. Division of Powers: The Federal Government in Juba would be strictly limited to National Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Macro-Finance. All other powers, including Health, Education, Infrastructure, and most importantly, Internal Police and Security, must be devolved to the three provinces. This prevents the federal army from being used as a domestic occupation force.

3.3.         Proportional Representation (Electoral System): The current First-Past-The-Post electoral concept guarantees that the largest ethnic groups will permanently dominate the government.

1. The Solution: Adopt Proportional Representation (PR). Under PR, if a political party wins 15% of the national vote, they get exactly 15% of the seats in parliament. This system forces coalition-building, ensures minority groups have guaranteed representation without needing to pick up weapons, and shifts politics from tribal identity to national party platforms.

4.    PHASE 3: Institutional Firewalls (Preventing a Relapse)

To prevent a new generation of leaders from recreating the current patronage network, the new constitution must erect impenetrable firewalls.

4.1.                  The Economic Firewall: Depoliticizing Oil: Currently, the President and his inner circle treat the national oil revenue as a private slush fund to buy loyalty.

1. The Solution: Create an Independent Sovereign Wealth and Revenue Authority. By constitutional law, all oil and mineral revenues must bypass the executive branch and go directly into an automated trust. This trust will legally mandate a strict formula: e.g., 10% directly to the producing province, 60% to the federal budget for infrastructure, and 30% saved for future generations. Politicians will no longer physically touch the money.

4.2.                  The Judicial Firewall: The Constitutional Court: Currently, the President appoints and dismisses judges at will, rendering the courts powerless.

1. The Solution: Establish an independent Constitutional Court. Judges must be appointed by an independent Judicial Service Commission (composed of legal peers, not politicians) and can only be removed by a highly complex impeachment process. This court will have the explicit power to strike down any executive decree or parliamentary law that violates the constitution.

4.3.                  The Security Firewall: Complete Military Restructuring: The 2018 R-ARCSS failed because it tried to merge rival ethnic militias into a single army while keeping their original commanders intact.

1. The Solution: A complete decommissioning of the current armed force’s structure. The new South Sudan People’s Defense Forces (SSPDF) must be rebuilt from the ground up, enforcing strict ethnic quotas to ensure no single tribe makes up more than 20% of any battalion or the officer corps.

Finally, following the consultations led by the African Union’s envoy, H.E. Jakaya M. Kikwete, it was essential to address three critical questions: the root causes of the current crisis, practical solutions, and the logistics for future political engagements. In this spirit, we propose a radical redesign of South Sudan’s constitutional structure, as discussed extensively earlier.

We believe this is the only effective approach that will permanently eliminate incentives for armed rebellion, power-sharing agreements, unconstitutional extensions, and corruption. This new structure would ensure that capturing Juba no longer equates to capturing all the wealth and power in South Sudan.

Dr Ayine Nigo is an author and lecturer at the University of Westminster, London, United Kingdom. He can be reached via nigoayine@gmail.com.

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