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Opinion| Juba Arabic and the politics of national language in South Sudan

May 21, 2026

BY DR. RUMBE SAMU KUPEK LO’BAKA ‘DOGA

Since its independence in 2011, South Sudan has maintained English as its sole official language to distinguish itself politically and symbolically from Sudan. In practice, however, English remains largely confined to elite and institutional domains, while Juba Arabic functions as the country’s principal lingua franca across ethnic and regional boundaries. This paper argues that recognizing Juba Arabic as a national language would better reflect South Sudan’s sociolinguistic realities and contribute to national cohesion. It further examines counterarguments favoring indigenous languages or Swahili and compares South Sudan’s language policy challenges with experiences in other multilingual African states. More broadly, the paper contends that shared language constitutes an essential foundation for civic nationalism, public communication, and post-conflict state-building in South Sudan.

Introduction

In post-conflict societies, language policy extends beyond administration. It shapes national identity, determines inclusion, and influences how citizens relate to the state. Following independence in 2011, South Sudan adopted English as its sole official language, partly to distance itself politically and symbolically from Sudan.[1] Yet in everyday practice, English remains largely confined to political, educational, and administrative elites, while Juba Arabic continues to serve as the country’s principal language of inter-ethnic communication.[2]

Linguists have described Juba Arabic as “the only real unifying language of a vast portion of the country” and the dominant language of everyday communication in the South Sudan capital, Juba.[3] It is widely used in markets, churches, transport systems, local courts, military barracks, and informal government interactions. Even senior political leaders, including President Salva Kiir, have frequently addressed public audiences in Juba Arabic when communicating directly with ordinary citizens.[4]

Unlike many indigenous languages associated with specific ethnic communities, Juba Arabic was historically developed as an intercommunal language of communication. For this reason, it has often functioned as a socially neutral medium across tribal and regional divides. Some scholars argue that after the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972, Juba Arabic increasingly evolved into a marker of what they describe as a “super-tribal” South Sudanese identity.[5]

The absence of a widely recognized common national language continues to undermine national integration and legal accessibility in South Sudan. Although the constitution acknowledges the country’s linguistic diversity, state institutions frequently rely on Juba Arabic in practice because neither English nor individual indigenous languages adequately facilitates mass communication across the population. The gap between official language policy and sociolinguistic reality, therefore, remains significant.

One of South Sudan’s enduring political challenges is the weakness of civic nationalism relative to ethnic affiliation. Political mobilization, public trust, and access to state resources often continue to operate through ethnic networks rather than through shared national institutions. In such contexts, a common lingua franca can play both a symbolic and practical role in cultivating civic belonging beyond communal identities. Language alone cannot resolve political fragmentation, but it can help create the communicative foundation upon which broader national cohesion is built.

Recognizing Juba Arabic as a national language would align state policy with everyday linguistic practice, improve communication between government and citizens, and contribute to long-term nation-building in South Sudan.

Juba Arabic: Identity, and the national language debate

Debates over language policy in South Sudan are not solely linguistic; they are also deeply political and symbolic. Critics argue that Juba Arabic’s Arabic roots associate it with northern domination, Islamization policies, and memories of the long civil wars with Khartoum. Supporters, however, emphasize its practical role as the only language currently capable of bridging ethnic divisions on a national scale.[6]

Since independence, the Government of South Sudan emphasized the promotion of “indigenous languages” as part of constructing a distinct South Sudanese identity. This position has often treated Juba Arabic as insufficiently indigenous because of its Arabic lexical base. Yet such arguments overlook the sociolinguistic evolution of Juba Arabic within South Sudan itself. Although historically influenced by Sudanese Arabic, Juba Arabic has developed its own grammar, pronunciation, and vocabulary over generations of local use. It is no longer merely an imported dialect, but a distinctly South Sudanese linguistic system shaped by local cultures and interactions.[7]

The Transitional Constitution of South Sudan recognizes all indigenous languages as part of the country’s cultural heritage. Still, it does not clearly address the practical role of Juba Arabic in national life.[8]  At independence, Arabic was removed as an official language partly to symbolically distance the new state from Sudan. However, removing Arabic from formal policy did not eliminate the widespread use of Juba Arabic among ordinary citizens. Instead, a disconnect emerged between the official state language and lived linguistic reality.

Ironically, post-independence efforts to reject Arabic in the name of political separation from Sudan have often reinforced dependence on English, itself a colonial language fluently spoken by only a relatively small segment of the population. In many African states, political authority continues to operate through oral rather than textual cultures. Policies grounded exclusively in elite written languages often fail to penetrate everyday social realities. Juba Arabic’s strength lies precisely in its accessibility within oral public life across South Sudan.

South Sudan’s later interest in adopting Swahili as an additional official language reflects broader ambitions for regional integration within the East African Community. Advocates argue that Swahili is politically neutral and economically useful across East Africa. However, despite its regional importance, Swahili currently lacks the widespread grassroots presence that Juba Arabic already possesses inside South Sudan.

Importantly, recognizing Juba Arabic as a national language would not necessarily require replacing English as the official language of administration, diplomacy, or higher education. Many multilingual African states distinguish between official working languages and national languages used for social integration and mass communication.[9] South Sudan could adopt a similar model by maintaining English for formal state functions while recognizing Juba Arabic as the principal language of national cohesion.

At the same time, such recognition should not come at the expense of indigenous languages. Languages such as Dinka, Nuer, Bari, Zande, Shilluk, and others remain central to cultural heritage, oral tradition, and communal identity. A balanced language policy would therefore protect and promote indigenous languages while also acknowledging the practical integrative role that Juba Arabic already performs across the country.

The historical development of Juba Arabic must also be understood within the wider regional history of military mobility and colonial frontier administration in East and Central Africa. Variants of Arabic-based contact languages emerged across military and trading corridors associated with the nineteenth-century Turco-Egyptian presence, the Equatoria campaigns, and later colonial military formations such as the King’s African Rifles (KAR) and related British colonial regiments in East Africa. Communities historically linked to these military networks — including the Nubi populations of Kibera in Kenya, Bombo in Uganda, and settlements around Arua, Yumbe, and Koboko in northwestern Uganda- developed related linguistic and cultural identities shaped by military service, migration, and interethnic interaction.[10]

The linguistic legacy of these frontier military systems extended into southern Sudan during and after the Equatoria campaigns associated with Emin Pasha and other colonial military administrative formations. Soldiers, porters, traders, and displaced populations contributed to the spread of simplified Arabic contact varieties that gradually evolved into localized lingua francas. In South Sudan, Juba Arabic emerged from this broader historical process but subsequently evolved into a distinctly South Sudanese sociolinguistic phenomenon shaped by local usage, urbanization, and postcolonial state formation.

Understanding this history is important because it situates Juba Arabic not as a foreign imposition, but as part of a long regional process of interaction, adaptation, and social integration across northeastern and central Africa.

Urbanization, displacement, and prolonged conflict have also transformed South Sudan’s linguistic landscape. In many urban areas and displacement settings, younger generations increasingly grow up speaking Juba Arabic as either a first or dominant second language. This emerging urban linguistic identity reflects changing social realities that state policy has yet to fully recognize.

Comparative lessons from other multilingual African states

Nigeria: English as neutral but socially distant

Nigeria, with more than 500 languages, adopted English as its official language partly to avoid privileging major ethnic languages such as Hausa, Yoruba, or Igbo.[11] Although English functions effectively within administration and higher education, it remains socially distant from much of the population. In practice, Nigerian Pidgin has emerged as the de facto lingua franca in urban centers, markets, media, and popular culture.

South Sudan faces a similar challenge. English may function symbolically and administratively, but Juba Arabic remains the language through which ordinary citizens communicate across ethnic boundaries. Nigeria’s experience demonstrates that state language policy often differs from linguistic reality on the ground.

Ethiopia: Ethnic federalism and language fragmentation

Ethiopia adopted a system of ethnic federalism in which regional states use local languages for administration and education. Although this policy initially strengthened linguistic inclusion and regional autonomy, it also reinforced ethnic identities as primary political identities.[12] Over time, language politics became intertwined with political competition and regional fragmentation.

South Sudan’s own movement toward federal arrangements carries comparable risks. In such contexts, the existence of a common inter-ethnic language can help reinforce national belonging alongside local identities. Historically, Amharic played such a role in Ethiopia before its dominance became politically contested. In South Sudan, Juba Arabic already performs a similar integrative function informally.

Tanzania: Swahili as a tool of nation-building

Tanzania is frequently cited as one of Africa’s most successful examples of linguistic nation-building. After independence, the Tanzanian state promoted Swahili as a national language despite significant ethnic diversity.[13] The policy succeeded largely because Swahili already existed as a widely used trade lingua franca and was not strongly associated with a single ethnic group.

Juba Arabic occupies a comparable sociolinguistic position in South Sudan today. Like Swahili in Tanzania, it functions as an accessible medium of communication across communities. Tanzania’s experience suggests that formalizing an already existing lingua franca can strengthen national cohesion while coexisting with local languages and identities.

4. Rebuttal and synthesis

Concerns about identity, history, and political symbolism in language policy are legitimate. The memory of marginalization under successive Sudanese governments continues to shape public attitudes toward anything associated with Arabic. Nevertheless, language policy in multilingual states is often most effective when grounded in sociolinguistic realities rather than symbolism alone.[14]

Indigenous languages remain indispensable to South Sudan’s cultural heritage and should receive constitutional protection, educational support, and institutional preservation. However, no single indigenous language currently possesses the demographic reach or political neutrality necessary to function as a national lingua franca across all regions.

Similarly, although Swahili offers long-term regional and economic advantages, it currently lacks the level of internal penetration needed to serve as South Sudan’s primary language of national integration. Juba Arabic, by contrast, already fulfills this role organically and without significant state support.

The persistence of linguistic fragmentation also reflects a broader citizenship gap in South Sudan, where many citizens continue to experience the state through ethnic intermediaries rather than through inclusive national institutions. A shared language of public communication may help narrow this gap by increasing accessibility, participation, and mutual intelligibility across communities.

Beyond questions of identity and symbolism, language policy also affects state capacity. Governments can only govern effectively when citizens understand laws, public health campaigns, judicial processes, educational systems, and political communication. In South Sudan, the continued reliance on English in formal administration often creates a communicative gap between state institutions and ordinary citizens. A nationally recognized lingua franca could therefore improve administrative accessibility, civic participation, and institutional legitimacy.

The importance of shared language becomes particularly evident during humanitarian crises, public health emergencies, and conflict situations, where effective communication can directly affect social stability and human welfare. In multilingual fragile states, communication failures often reinforce exclusion, mistrust, and misinformation. A widely understood national lingua franca can therefore serve not only cultural and political functions but also developmental and humanitarian ones.

In societies emerging from prolonged civil conflict, shared languages often become instruments not only of communication but also of reconciliation. By facilitating everyday interaction across ethnic and regional lines, Juba Arabic already performs an informal peace-building function within South Sudanese society.

Comparative evidence from Tanzania and Nigeria suggests that recognizing an existing lingua franca often promotes social cohesion more effectively than attempting to impose either an elite language or a politically symbolic alternative disconnected from everyday usage. In South Sudan’s case, acknowledging Juba Arabic would not erase ethnic diversity; rather, it could provide a shared communicative space through which that diversity can coexist within a broader national identity.

A fragmented society cannot build a shared political future without a shared space of communication.

5. Conclusion

A national language should be evaluated not only by its historical symbolism but also by its practical capacity to unify citizens and facilitate communication. In contemporary South Sudan, Juba Arabic already serves as the most widely accessible inter-ethnic language in daily life. Markets, churches, urban neighborhoods, transport systems, and informal state institutions rely on it extensively across regional and tribal boundaries.

Recognizing Juba Arabic as a national language would therefore align public policy with sociolinguistic reality. Such recognition could improve communication between state institutions and citizens, strengthen social cohesion, and contribute to the gradual development of a shared South Sudanese civic identity beyond ethnic affiliation.

Language alone cannot resolve South Sudan’s political crises, institutional weaknesses, or patterns of exclusion. However, no durable national project can succeed without a shared medium through which citizens communicate, deliberate, and imagine themselves as part of a common political community.

For a country still confronting the legacies of conflict, fragmentation, and weak national integration, that alignment may prove increasingly important to the long-term project of nation-building.

The author is a concerned South Sudanese. The views and opinions expressed in the article are solely his and do not necessarily represent the official position, policy, or views of any political party, institution, organization, employer, affiliate, or association with which he works or collaborates.

[1] Republic of South Sudan, The Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan, 2011 (Juba: Government of South Sudan, 2011).

[1] Stefano Manfredi, “A New State, an Old Language Policy, and a Pidgin-Creole: Juba Arabic in South Sudan,” HAL-SHS, 2013.

[1] Ibid.

Bibliography

  1. Blommaert, Jan. Language, Society and Globalization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014. https://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=1.+Blommaert,+Jan.+Language,+Society+and+Globalization.+Cambridge:+Cambridge+University+Press,+2014.&hl=en&as_sdt=0&as_vis=1&oi=scholart

[1] Republic of South Sudan, The Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan, 2011 (Juba: Government of South Sudan, 2011).

[2] Stefano Manfredi, “A New State, an Old Language Policy, and a Pidgin-Creole: Juba Arabic in South Sudan,” HAL-SHS, 2013.

[3] Ibid.

[4] IWMF (International Women’s Media Foundation), “Voice of a Nation: How Juba Arabic Helps Bridge a Factious South Sudan,” 2013.

[5] Stefano Manfredi, “The Construction of Linguistic Borders and the Rise of National Identity in South Sudan: Some Insights into Juba Arabic,” 2017.

[6] Manfredi, “A New State, an Old Language Policy.”

[7] Ibid.

[8] Republic of South Sudan, The Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan, 2011.

[9] Joshua A. Fishman, Language and Nationalism: Two Integrative Essays (Rowley, MA: Newbury House Publishers, 1972).

[10] Ali A. Mazrui and Alamin M. Mazrui, The Power of Babel: Language and Governance in the African Experience (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).

[11] Mazrui and Mazrui, The Power of Babel.

[12] Jan Blommaert, Language, Society and Globalization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

[13] Mazrui and Mazrui, The Power of Babel.

[14] Robert Phillipson, Linguistic Imperialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).


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