The recent amendment to the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) represents far more than a technical adjustment to the peace roadmap. It reflects a profound political choice that, in the view of many critics, prioritizes the preservation of executive dominance over the transformative objectives that originally underpinned the peace agreement. By allowing elections to proceed without a permanent constitution or a national population and housing census, the amendment alters the sequence of reforms designed to establish a credible democratic transition.
The R-ARCSS envisioned a clear constitutional order: institutional reforms, security sector transformation, constitution-making, a national census, and only then democratic elections. Reversing this sequence risks turning elections from an instrument of democratic legitimacy into a mechanism for preserving the existing balance of political power.
At the centre of the debate are two strategic pillars that have historically shaped political authority in South Sudan: control of the security sector and control of public resources. These are not merely administrative functions; they form the foundations of political influence, state authority, and electoral competitiveness.
A genuinely unified national army, as required by the peace agreement, would reduce exclusive control over the armed forces and establish security institutions accountable to the state rather than competing political centres. Likewise, transparent management of oil revenues and public finances would limit opportunities for patronage, strengthen institutional accountability, and constrain the political use of state resources. These reforms are not peripheral; they lie at the heart of the peace agreement’s promise to replace personalised rule with constitutional governance.
For this reason, many observers argue that the slow implementation of key provisions of the R-ARCSS has not been accidental but politically advantageous. Delays in deploying the Necessary Unified Forces, completing security sector reform, finalising a permanent constitution, and establishing robust financial accountability mechanisms have preserved the existing distribution of political power while extending the transitional period.
The latest legislative amendments reinforce these concerns. Elections are now scheduled to take place before the constitutional framework is completed. That framework is expected to define the powers of government, guarantee civil liberties, regulate the electoral system, and protect the rights of citizens. Holding elections under an unreformed Transitional Constitution inevitably raises questions about whether political competition can take place on genuinely equal constitutional footing.
Similarly, postponing a national census while preparing for elections has fuelled debate over representation, constituency boundaries, and equitable political participation. Population data are not merely statistical records; they provide the demographic foundation upon which representative democracy derives its legitimacy.
The objections raised by opposition legislators, together with earlier warnings from the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC), underscore a broader concern. Peace agreements derive their legitimacy from consensus among their signatories. Significant amendments adopted without broad political agreement risk undermining confidence in both the agreement itself and the institutions responsible for implementing it.
Many critics further argue that extending the transitional period while postponing fundamental reforms reflects a political strategy aimed at preserving continuity rather than enabling transformation. Under this interpretation, dialogue may continue, institutions may remain formally intact, and elections may eventually take place, yet the underlying structures of political authority remain largely unchanged. The appearance of transition, therefore, risks replacing its substance.
South Sudan’s democratic future cannot be secured merely by holding elections. Elections derive their legitimacy from constitutional order, impartial institutions, professional security services, transparent management of public resources, and equal political competition. Without these foundations, ballots alone cannot produce accountable government.
Ultimately, the central question confronting South Sudan is not simply when elections should be held, but under what constitutional, institutional, and security conditions they should take place. A peace agreement implemented selectively loses its transformative purpose. Constitutional reform delayed indefinitely ceases to be reform altogether. Security institutions that remain politically aligned cannot fully guarantee democratic competition. Public resources administered without strong accountability continue to erode public confidence in the state.
The long-term stability of South Sudan will depend not on extending transitional arrangements, but on faithfully implementing the comprehensive reforms envisioned by the R-ARCSS. Sustainable peace requires institutions that are stronger than individuals, laws that prevail over political expediency, and governance that serves the Republic rather than the interests of those who temporarily hold power. Only through genuine constitutionalism, accountable public finance, and politically neutral security institutions can South Sudan move from perpetual transition to durable democracy.
The writer, Juol Nhomngek Daniel, is a South Sudanese constitutional lawyer, academic, and political figure. He studied law at Makerere University in Kampala, Uganda. He is an independent legal researcher and constitutional expert, and serves as a lecturer and Deputy Dean of the College of Law at Starford International University in Juba. He is also a member of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO).
The views expressed in ‘opinion’ articles published by Radio Tamazuj are solely those of the writer. The veracity of any claims made is the responsibility of the author, not Radio Tamazuj.
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