Opinion| Peace without reform: A South Sudanese illusion

South Sudan is under siege, and the fading hopes of millions are impossible to ignore. The world’s youngest nation has been mired in conflict, underdevelopment, and chronic political instability since its independence in 2011. While external observers often attribute these challenges to post-independence growing pains or inter-ethnic tensions, a closer examination reveals deeper, systemic issues. These systemic issues are deeply rooted in the structure and conduct of President Salva Kiir’s regime. Two critical dynamics obstruct the path to sustainable peace: (1) the growing economic and military reliance on Uganda, which compromises South Sudanese sovereignty, and (2) the entrenched influence of the Jieng Council of Elders (JCE), a politically motivated ethnic body that operates as a shadow power center. Together, these two forces—reliance on Uganda and the JCE’s influence—explain why the regime not only resists meaningful reforms but also actively suppresses dissent, exposing its aversion to truth and accountability.

Kiir’s regime, responsible for the door-to-door killings of Nuer civilians in Juba in December 2013 and the deaths of over 400,000 South Sudanese, has driven millions into displacement and exile. The same regime continues to obstruct the full implementation of the 2018 Revitalized Peace Agreement, revealing a clear unwillingness to pursue genuine reconciliation. Kiir has demonstrated greater commitment to preserving the autocratic system that sparked the civil war than to building a peaceful, democratic future.

For more than a decade, the South Sudanese government has allowed Ugandan merchants to dominate the food supply chain in Juba and other urban markets. This was not merely the result of market competition or regional trade dynamics—it was a policy-driven outcome. Uganda, due to its logistical proximity and informal state-to-state agreements, has effectively monopolized the supply of basic goods to the capital. The implications are serious. With no viable domestic production or alternative foreign suppliers, Ugandan traders are free to fix prices at will. This deepens the hardship for South Sudanese citizens who already suffer from inflation and unemployment. Indigenous producers, traders, and entrepreneurs are effectively sidelined. This is purely a strategic surrender of South Sudan’s economic sovereignty to Uganda. Under President Kiir, vital oil revenues are siphoned off to Uganda, effectively financing a regime that has compromised the nation’s sovereignty. Meanwhile, South Sudanese soldiers and civil servants, who should be the backbone of the state, are left to languish for months, some for nearly a year, without salaries. This practice is not just reckless—it is profoundly disgraceful, betraying those entrusted with upholding the country’s stability. This raises serious questions about the regime’s legitimacy and the country’s autonomy. In essence, South Sudan’s economic and political survival mechanisms are now dependent on external forces rather than being grounded in the country itself—an arrangement incompatible with true peace or internal self-reliance.

Another major obstacle to peace is the Jieng Council of Elders (JCE), an institutionalized tribal group with an overtly ethnic-nationalist agenda. Although nominally a tribal council, the JCE has far exceeded its traditional cultural mandate. It functions as a political advisory body and, at times, a de facto policy-making institution that supports and sustains the Kiir regime. The JCE advances policies that consolidate Dinka dominance across national institutions, including the army, security forces, civil service, and political appointments. This erodes the principle of national unity and fuels resentment from other ethnic communities. Instead of supporting inclusive peace processes, the JCE often pushes narratives that delegitimize opposition leaders. Moreover, it frames the civil war in ethnocentric terms, hardening divisions. The influence of the JCE is incompatible with democratic governance or pluralism. By embedding tribal loyalty into state structures, the regime ensures that loyalty to Kiir often supersedes loyalty to the constitution or the people. As long as this situation persists, institutional reform and national healing will remain impossible.

The political reality in South Sudan today is inseparable from the ethnic ideology at the core of President Kiir’s regime. While the government and its supporters routinely deny or downplay this fact, the overwhelming dominance of the Dinka ethnic group across all major national institutions — from the military to the ministries — is an undeniable truth that any honest observer can see. Claiming that appointments are based solely on merit, while one tribe disproportionately occupies positions of power, is not only dishonest but also a blatant insult to the intelligence of the South Sudanese people. This system is no accident; it is a calculated effort to consolidate power within an ethnic elite, undermining national unity and democratic governance. The result is a deeply tribalized and authoritarian state, where exclusion, nepotism, and repression have replaced the inclusive values for which the people of South Sudan fought during their long struggle for independence. This truth must be confronted, not denied—if the country is to progress toward genuine peace, justice, and nation-building.

If appointments in South Sudan are truly based on merit, how does the government justify the overwhelming dominance of a single ethnic group in national institutions, especially in a country with over 60 ethnic communities?

The regime offers no credible argument or evidence to justify the Dinka’s disproportionate dominance in national institutions.

South Sudanese who critique the regime, whether from within or in exile, face threats, harassment, or worse. Independent journalists, civil society actors, and even religious leaders have been silenced or purged under the pretext of national security. The regime and its supporters treat dissenting voices not as part of a healthy democratic process but as threats or acts of sabotage. They fear critical voices because they expose deep insecurity about the regime’s own narrative. If their version of events, policies, and intentions were factually grounded, they would have no reason to fear scrutiny. Instead, there is a systematic and ongoing censorship of alternative narratives. For instance, media outlets are muzzled, and diaspora voices are dismissed as traitors or agents of foreign influence. There is also a deliberate campaign to delegitimize critical discourse, where critics are not debated but discredited. This highlights the regime’s inability or unwillingness to defend its record with evidence and reason.

A government that works for its citizens should not fear uncomfortable truths—unless it has something to hide. Transparency, accountability, and an open civic space are the hallmarks of sustainable peace. The regime’s aversion to these principles is not a sign of strength, but of insecurity.

As long as President Kiir remains in power under these conditions—outsourcing national sovereignty to a neighboring country, relying on an ethnically exclusive council to make policy decisions, silencing or bullying opposition leaders, and suppressing truth in favor of a deceptive narrative—South Sudan will not achieve peace. Lasting peace requires structural transformation, not just ceasefires or power-sharing agreements. It demands a government that serves all its people, embraces dissent as valuable feedback, and commits to national interests—not tribal or foreign ones. Unless these foundational issues are addressed directly, peace in South Sudan will remain nothing more than an illusion. South Sudan’s sovereignty has been sold, peace abandoned, and dictatorship entrenched—leaving its people clinging only to hope for better days.

The writer, Duop Chak Wuol is an analyst, writer, and former editor-in-chief of the South Sudan News Agency. A graduate of the University of Colorado, he specializes in security and geopolitics in South Sudan and East Africa. His extensive writings have been featured in numerous respected local, regional, and international publications, including AllAfrica, Radio Tamazuj, The Independent (Uganda), The Arab Weekly, The Standard (Kenya), Sudan Tribune, The Chronicle (Ghana), and Addis Standard (Ethiopia), among others. He can be reached at duop282@gmail.com.

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