Opinion| How Nilepet’s executive tenure undermines business progress and stability in the oil and gas sector

The Nile Petroleum Corporation (Nilepet) is South Sudan’s national Oil and Gas Company, wholly owned by the Government of South Sudan. Established under the 2012 Petroleum Act, it is one of the country’s largest employers, with over 5,000 executive and technical personnel working across its headquarters, subsidiaries, and Joint Operating Companies (JOCs). Since Nilepet generates a substantial share of national revenue, effective oversight of its strategic vision and daily operations is of critical importance to the country.

Nilepet’s executive management falls under the direct purview of the Office of the President, with the Minister of Presidential Affairs serving as Chairperson of the Board of Directors. This structure provides the corporation with high-level strategic backing, enabling it to bypass unnecessary bureaucracy and avoid protracted intermediary approvals in a fast-paced, capital-intensive industry.

However, recent frequent changes in the appointment of Nilepet’s Managing Director and Chief Executive Officer (MD/CEO) have had severe adverse effects on the company’s stability and competitiveness. Unlike routine government administration, commercial enterprises require sustained leadership continuity to execute multi-year strategic plans. For Nilepet to effectively compete against regional and international peers, it demands stability at the helm.

To address this challenge, Nilepet requires a clear, formalized tenure policy. Incoming MD/CEOs should be appointed for a fixed term, ideally between two and three years, and should be accompanied by a written mandate outlining clear Key Performance Indicators (KPIs). The Board of Directors should conduct structured performance evaluations on a quarterly and annual basis, culminating in a comprehensive review at the end of the term.

Establishing a defined tenure and evaluation framework will institutionalize accountability and ensure Nilepet fulfills its national mandate. Furthermore, it will eliminate the counterproductive cycle of blame-shifting that often follows abrupt leadership transitions, where incoming executives attribute operational shortfalls to the decisions of their predecessors rather than focusing on long-term growth.

Exercising statutory authority over executive tenure

The Board of Directors (BOD) should effectively exercise its mandate under the National Petroleum and Gas Corporation (NILEPET) Act, 2019, and the Nilepet Provisional Order, 2021, which grant the Board full authority to recommend the appointment or relief of the Managing Director and Chief Executive Officer (MD/CEO) to the President. Utilizing this statutory power to propose a fixed, predictable executive tenure for presidential approval would insulate the national oil and gas corporation from abrupt leadership transitions and ensure uninterrupted operational continuity.

Stabilizing secondment to Joint Operating Companies (JOCs)

Historically, every change in Nilepet’s top leadership has triggered sweeping, disproportionate reshuffles of Nilepet secondees across the three Joint Operating Companies (JOCs), as incoming executives replace established personnel with their own teams. This pattern disrupts institutional memory, operational sequencing, and workflow stability within the JOCs. To protect commercial performance and operational continuity, Secondment to the JOCs must likewise be governed by fixed tenures rather than tied to changes in the MD/CEO’s office.

Reforming Board of Directors Composition

Equal attention must be paid to the composition of the Board of Directors. Membership should be restricted strictly to representatives of core government institutions with a direct operational, regulatory, or strategic link to the oil and gas sector, specifically:

1. Ministry of Presidential Affairs                                                                   

2. Ministry of Petroleum

3. Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning

4. Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs (Legal Affairs)

5. Ministry of Trade and Industry

6. Ministry of Environment and Forestry

7. National Security Service

Removing provisions that allow the appointment of former government officials and independent private business figures will eliminate potential conflicts of interest and ensure the Board remains focused solely on sovereign oversight and corporate performance.

The writer is an Oil and Gas Executive and Environmental/Public Health Expert. He can be reached via thuokyoach@gmail.com.

The views expressed in ‘opinion’ articles published by Radio Tamazuj are solely those of the writer. The veracity of any claims made is the responsibility of the author, not Radio Tamazuj.


Welcome

Install
×