As South Sudan approaches the December 2026 elections, the United States faces a critical test of whether it can move beyond symbolic diplomacy to restore meaningful leverage. Since South Sudan’s independence, Washington has invested billions of dollars in peacebuilding, humanitarian assistance, and diplomatic engagement. Yet the country remains trapped in political instability, incomplete implementation of the September 2018 revitalized peace agreement, and a political system that prioritizes regime survival over institutional reform. Diplomatic statements and international appeals have rarely altered the calculations of political elites, who have learned they can withstand international criticism while retaining control of state institutions, oil revenues, and other national resources.
To change this dynamic, the United States must address the structural forces sustaining the status quo rather than merely its symptoms. These include external political and military backing, economic systems that sustain elite patronage, and expanding geopolitical competition that provides alternative sources of support for Juba. Restoring U.S. influence before the 2026 elections will require targeted measures paired with sustained diplomatic engagement to raise the costs of obstruction and create incentives to implement the peace agreement and support a credible political transition.
South Sudan’s political crisis cannot be understood solely through decisions made in Juba. While President Salva Kiir’s government bears primary responsibility for obstructing the implementation of the revitalized agreement and delaying critical reforms, its resilience depends heavily on external backing, particularly from Uganda. Kampala’s relationship with Juba is driven largely by its economic interests, as well as concerns about regional security and stability.
This external backing has emboldened Kiir, particularly because of the military and diplomatic support he has received from Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni. He has also been strengthened by the diplomatic backing of Russia and China in the United Nations Security Council, where both countries have consistently abstained on resolutions concerning South Sudan, limiting the Council’s ability to apply unified international pressure and reinforcing the diplomatic space available to his government. This is why Kiir’s government is unlikely to respond to diplomatic appeals alone and requires a strategically designed, multifaceted approach that imposes surgical sanctions to paralyze the regime’s patronage networks, with particular emphasis on the oil sector, which provides the financial lifeblood that enables the regime to sustain elite patronage, finance its security apparatus, and resist meaningful political reform.
Uganda’s role in sustaining this political environment has weakened international efforts to promote peace because Kampala’s backing of South Sudan’s government allows Kiir to ignore external pressure. As a result, South Sudan’s leaders, particularly Kiir, have delayed reforms and undermined key provisions of the peace agreement with limited or no political consequences. Uganda remains a U.S. security partner due to its role in regional stability and counterterrorism efforts, but continued cooperation without addressing Kampala’s role in shielding Juba creates a strategic contradiction. Washington cannot credibly promote accountability while overlooking policies and actions that reinforce political stagnation.
Rather than abandoning its partnership with Uganda, the United States should rebalance its engagement by applying strategic pressure while preserving avenues for cooperation. Visa restrictions, diplomatic engagement, and closer scrutiny of military cooperation should be directed toward individuals and institutions whose actions impede South Sudan’s political transition. The objective is not to punish Uganda, but to encourage policies that support implementation of the peace agreement and raise the political costs of undermining it. Washington should also deepen engagement with other East African partners to reduce overreliance on a single regional actor and build broader regional support for peace implementation. Continuing to rely heavily on Uganda to help implement a peace agreement that it has contributed to undermining reflects a strategic miscalculation that the United States should reassess.
While Uganda provides critical external support that helps preserve South Sudan’s political status quo, oil provides the economic resources that sustain it. Since independence, South Sudan has relied overwhelmingly on oil revenues to finance government operations, yet despite its significant natural resources, it remains among the world’s poorest countries. Rather than supporting broad-based development, oil wealth has largely reinforced elite patronage networks, strengthened security institutions, and helped sustain political survival while leaving critical needs such as infrastructure and vital public services underfunded.
Control over oil revenues provides Washington with one of its strongest sources of leverage. Rather than imposing broad economic restrictions that could deepen humanitarian suffering, the United States should target the individuals, companies, and financial networks responsible for corruption and the misuse of oil wealth. Linking international economic engagement to measurable progress on peace implementation, governance reform, and accountability would shift incentives among South Sudan’s leaders while minimizing harm to ordinary South Sudanese citizens who are intended to be protected.
As South Sudan approaches the 2026 elections, U.S. diplomatic and economic engagement should therefore be conditioned on concrete benchmarks, including implementation of the peace agreement, security sector reform, constitutional and financial reforms, and credible electoral preparations ahead of the elections. Such conditional engagement would preserve support for the South Sudanese people while increasing pressure on political actors who benefit from maintaining the current system.
Supporters of the government argue that stronger pressure could push South Sudan closer to China or other partners willing to provide financial assistance without political conditions. This concern is valid. China has become a dominant economic actor in South Sudan’s oil sector, offering Juba alternatives to Western pressure. Yet China’s influence, which has largely benefited elites and those in power rather than ordinary citizens, has expanded during a period in which Washington relied primarily on caution and diplomatic persuasion. The greater risk is not that stronger pressure carries costs, but that continued reliance on persuasion alone will produce the same limited results that have characterized U.S. policy for more than a decade.
The December 2026 elections present both an opportunity and a risk. They could strengthen political legitimacy, but they could also reinforce the existing political order if conducted without meaningful reforms. Elections alone cannot resolve South Sudan’s political crisis. Without security sector reform, independent institutions, political freedoms, and meaningful political participation, they risk legitimizing existing power structures rather than enabling a genuine democratic transition. Even if the regime conducts elections and declares Kiir the winner, the underlying conflict and related political challenges will still not be resolved.
Washington should therefore support the electoral process while linking diplomatic and financial engagement to measurable benchmarks, including security sector reform, credible electoral institutions, protection of political freedoms, and meaningful access for domestic and international observers. The United States cannot determine South Sudan’s political future, but it can help shape the conditions under which elections occur by strengthening institutions, supporting civil society, and increasing the consequences for actors who obstruct reform to preserve their power and advance authoritarian policies.
Any renewed U.S. strategy must also reflect South Sudan’s changing geopolitical environment. China’s economic influence—particularly in the oil sector—and Russia’s expanding security engagement have provided Juba with alternative partnerships that reduce the effectiveness of Western pressure. However, strategic competition should not become an excuse for inaction. Washington’s declining influence stems not only from the growing presence of Beijing and Moscow but also from a policy approach that has too often prioritized maintaining engagement over achieving meaningful political outcomes. Without combining diplomacy with credible consequences, the United States risks allowing other external actors to shape South Sudan’s political and economic trajectory.
The United States should not attempt to compete by replicating the models of China or Russia. Its comparative advantage lies in strengthening institutions, supporting civil society, building regional coalitions, and promoting partnerships grounded in transparency, accountability, and long-term development. Humanitarian assistance should continue, but it must be complemented by targeted measures against individuals and networks that undermine peace and misuse public resources.
U.S. success will also depend on closer coordination with regional and international partners, including the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the United Nations, the European Union, and the Troika countries. A unified approach would reduce opportunities for South Sudan’s political elites to exploit divisions among external actors while strengthening collective efforts to advance implementation of the peace agreement and promote accountability.
Ultimately, South Sudan’s future will be determined by its people, not by outside powers. The United States, however, can influence the political environment in which South Sudanese citizens pursue that future. As the December 2026 elections approach, Washington must decide whether to continue relying on diplomatic appeals that have yielded limited results or adopt a strategy that more effectively aligns political incentives with meaningful reform.
Such a strategy requires recognizing that South Sudan’s political resilience rests on interconnected sources of support: regional backing that shields political elites from accountability, oil revenues that finance patronage networks, incomplete implementation of the peace agreement, and expanding geopolitical competition. Addressing these challenges demands more than continued engagement. It requires a balanced approach that combines diplomacy with credible consequences, targeted pressure with sustained partnership, and accountability with continued support for the South Sudanese people.
The objective is not to isolate South Sudan or impose solutions from abroad, despite claims by the regime. Rather, Washington should use its remaining leverage to encourage the implementation of agreed reforms, strengthen democratic institutions, and ensure that national resources serve the public interest instead of political survival. Moving beyond symbolic diplomacy means recognizing that influence is measured not by the frequency of engagement but by the ability to shape incentives that advance peace, accountability, and a credible political transition.
If the United States hopes to play a constructive role in South Sudan’s future, it must move beyond symbolic diplomacy and employ the full range of diplomatic, economic, and political tools at its disposal. Otherwise, it risks further eroding its credibility while allowing South Sudan’s political trajectory to become increasingly shaped by domestic elites and external powers whose priorities do not necessarily align with lasting peace, accountable governance, or democratic reform.
Duop Chak Wuol is an analyst, critical writer, and former editor-in-chief of the South Sudan News Agency. He is a graduate of the University of Colorado and writes on geopolitics, security, and social affairs in South Sudan and the broader East Africa region. His work has appeared in leading regional and international outlets, including AllAfrica, Radio Tamazuj, The Independent (Uganda), The Arab Weekly, The Standard (Kenya), The Chronicle (Ghana), Addis Standard (Ethiopia), and Sudan Tribune. In 2017, the Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation highlighted his article on Meles Zenawi’s role in Ethiopia’s economic transformation. He can be reached at duop282@gmail.com.
The views expressed in ‘opinion’ articles published by Radio Tamazuj are solely those of the writer. The veracity of any claims made is the responsibility of the author, not Radio Tamazuj.
and then