President Salva Kiir’s leadership trajectory reveals a dangerous shift toward absolute authoritarian rule, specifically targeting the permanent neutralization of the main opposition leader, Dr. Riek Machar. This development poses a serious risk—not only to South Sudan’s fragile stability, but potentially to President Kiir’s own long-term position.
Multiple indicators suggest that Kiir is actively pursuing a covert strategy to permanently remove Machar from South Sudan’s political landscape. According to sources, initial discussions reportedly took place in Entebbe, Uganda, on April 2, 2025, and later expanded in Juba on May 23, 2025. These tactics reportedly include politically motivated detention, forced exile, and—according to some sources—potentially more severe actions that may compromise Machar’s safety. The meeting was attended by Kiir’s handpicked security officials—most of whom were from the Bahr el Ghazal region—as well as members of the Jieng Council of Elders (JCE) and three Ugandan agents from Uganda’s External Security Organisation (ESO). The ESO agents arrived in Juba on the morning of May 23 aboard a plane from Kenya. On or around May 29, 2025, Kiir received assurance from Museveni that his government was determined and ready to protect Kiir’s regime.
President Kiir is reportedly working behind the scenes with a breakaway faction of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO), which emerged on April 9, 2025. While this faction claims to support the full implementation of the September 2018 revitalized peace agreement, it also accuses Machar’s loyalists of obstructing its progress. However, the group has little support in SPLM-IO strongholds, raising doubts about the strategic value or sincerity of Kiir’s alliance with them. In response, senior SPLM-IO officials accuse the group of being a creation of Kiir’s regime, designed to replicate the July 2016 scenario in which current Vice President Taban Deng Gai took over SPLM-IO leadership after Machar fled Juba.
This pattern reflects growing confidence within Kiir’s most loyal inner circle—particularly the influential JCE, a group frequently criticized for advancing policies perceived as ethnically exclusive and favoring the Dinka elite—that purging Machar would resolve South Sudan’s political deadlock. In reality, such a move would trigger dangerous and far-reaching consequences.
Kiir may underestimate the broad network of domestic and international observers—some embedded within his own ranks—who are quietly documenting his every move, every covert order, and every attempt to eliminate opposition figures through undemocratic or violent means. For Kiir and his allies to believe they can carry out such an operation in silence or with impunity is profoundly misguided. Information is reportedly leaking, and contingency plans may already be in motion—beyond Kiir’s direct control.
However, a senior South Sudanese government official, speaking on condition of anonymity, told this author on June 17, 2025, that there is a coordinated plot by Kiir and Museveni to systematically undermine Machar’s political relevance by shaping international perception and obstructing calls for his release from house arrest and demands for accountability. According to the official, the two leaders conspired to consistently block Dr. Machar’s access to foreign dignitaries and African Union (AU) officials, fearing that direct engagement might unravel the narrative they have constructed to justify his prolonged detention.
Their strategy reportedly centers on delaying any investigation into Machar’s questionable confinement until after the 2026 elections, hoping that the passage of time will overshadow international scrutiny. Depending on the political climate at that time, the two leaders are still weighing whether to release Machar quietly just before the December 2026 elections to minimize backlash, or to clear him of any wrongdoing immediately afterward—a calculated move intended to neutralize his influence while maintaining a veneer of legality.
There is growing unease within both Kiir’s and Museveni’s inner circles regarding Machar’s potential to sway global opinion and disrupt their tightly controlled political dynamics. Some of Kiir’s own loyalists have begun warning him that the continued detention of Machar without due process—coupled with the systematic denial of access to international and regional leaders—is counterproductive and could trigger serious backlash.
This revelation underscores the extent to which political survival—rather than democratic accountability—is driving regional alliances. As 2026 approaches, the international community is watching closely to see whether pressure will mount for transparency and justice, or whether silence will prevail in the face of Kiir’s calculated political maneuvering.
History offers a clear warning: leaders who embrace authoritarian extremism under the illusion of invincibility often meet disgrace—or demise. Salva Kiir’s current trajectory mirrors that of past tyrannical strongmen: like Mobutu Sese Seko, he risks being abandoned by loyalists the moment power slips; like Muammar Gaddafi, he risks reaping the fury of a population long silenced; like Idi Amin, he may be forced into exile and meet his end in disgrace; like Nicolae Ceaușescu, he risks being consumed by the very state apparatus he built to protect himself. Each believed they were untouchable—until the tide turned. Attempting to eliminate Machar forcibly may prove to be the defining miscalculation of Kiir’s rule. It will not bring peace. It will provoke retaliation, deepen ethnic divisions, and potentially trigger intervention from factions that have so far remained diplomatically restrained.
Furthermore, such an act would strip away the final veil of legitimacy from Kiir’s leadership, branding him not just as a dictator but as a ruthless tyrant. If Machar is purged, it would signal the beginning of the end of Kiir’s oppressive regime. The retaliation from the Nuer community, to which Machar belongs, would be severe and enduring—potentially lasting decades, if not centuries. Salva Kiir, Yoweri Museveni, and the JCE would be gravely mistaken to contemplate, let alone attempt, such an act.
According to sources close to the matter, discussions regarding Kiir’s future are reportedly taking place behind closed doors—not framed as policy debates, but as preparations for potential consequences should his current course of action continue. Global and regional actors are preparing for scenarios in which he is no longer in control. His adversaries are planning strategically and waiting patiently. Even his closest allies, Museveni among them, fail to foresee what is looming.
If Kiir proceeds with the reported plan to eliminate Machar, he may well initiate the beginning of his political downfall—and potentially place himself in personal jeopardy.
There remains a narrow and rapidly closing window. If ignored, Kiir will not be remembered as the founding leader of South Sudan, but as a cautionary tale—spoken of alongside fallen, disgraceful, self-proclaimed strongmen who once terrorized their citizens in their illusion of invincibility.
The writer, Duop Chak Wuol, is an analyst, writer, and former editor-in-chief of the South Sudan News Agency. A graduate of the University of Colorado, he specializes in security and geopolitics in South Sudan and East Africa. His extensive writings have been featured in numerous respected local and international publications, including AllAfrica, Radio Tamazuj, The Independent (Uganda), Sudan Tribune, The Arab Weekly, The Standard (Kenya), The Chronicle (Ghana), and Addis Standard (Ethiopia), among others. He can be reached at duop282@gmail.com.
The views expressed in ‘opinion’ articles published by Radio Tamazuj are solely those of the writer. The veracity of any claims made is the responsibility of the author, not Radio Tamazuj.