The overlap of powers between the town councils/municipalities and the county commissioners in South Sudan stems from a complex interplay of historical, political, and institutional factors, exacerbated by the nation’s nascent statehood and ongoing instability.
This challenge is deeply embedded within a “hybrid governance” system, where formal state structures coexist with, and often interact ambiguously with, customary laws and traditional authorities. South Sudan operates under a hybrid governance model where statutory laws and customary practices often intersect and, at times, conflict. Customary law is deeply ingrained, regulating conflicts and providing local justice, often being more relied upon by citizens than formal state institutions. This firm reliance on traditional structures can lead to situations where the mandates of town councils/municipalities, which are formal bodies, overlap or clash with the de facto authority of customary leaders, who may be aligned with or influenced by the county commissioners.
The capacity of formal local government entities, such as town councils and municipalities, is often hindered by institutional weaknesses, limited financial resources, and unclear operational guidelines. This lack of clarity can lead to ambiguous jurisdictional boundaries, making it challenging to differentiate responsibilities between municipal authorities and county-level administrations. For example, issues such as the “lack of proper division of tasks” and “lack of consultation” are common in various municipal contexts, contributing to these overlaps.
South Sudan’s governance system is a product of successive historical attempts at state-building, leading to a layered and often inconsistent administrative framework. The establishment of district councils in the broader Sudan dates back to 1951. However, these structures have undergone significant transformations, sometimes reducing their importance or shifting responsibilities, resulting in a complex inheritance of administrative roles.
This evolution has not always resulted in clearly defined roles for new institutions, such as municipalities, in relation to county-level administrations.
In crucial sectors like land governance, South Sudan exhibits characteristics of “limited statehood,” where formal institutions have restricted reach and effectiveness. Land relations are intimately connected to social organization and power dynamics, frequently falling under the purview of both statutory law and customary practices. This directly creates overlap: formal municipal bodies may have legal mandates over urban land use, while customary authorities, potentially operating under the umbrella of county administration, assert control based on traditional tenure systems.
The persistent political turmoil and civil conflict in South Sudan contribute to difficulties in governance. Interference in administrative matters and strained relations between political and administrative officials can further blur the lines of authority and responsibility between different levels of local government.
While specific local laws are not detailed in the provided materials, general responsibilities can be inferred based on the typical functions of these entities in a formal governance structure and the context of South Sudan.
The town councils/municipalities are typically responsible for urban development, local service delivery (e.g., sanitation, local infrastructure, and market regulation), and implementing regional policies within defined urban areas. Their mandate often includes land administration within municipal boundaries, including zoning and urban planning.
County commissioners, as representatives of the central government at the county level, are generally tasked with maintaining law and order, overseeing broader administrative functions, coordinating development (which includes both urban and rural areas), and ensuring central government policies are implemented. They often serve as a link between the central government and local communities, including traditional authorities.
The lack of precise delineation in local laws creates ambiguity. Where such laws exist, their enforcement can be weak or inconsistent due to limited state capacity, further contributing to overlaps and conflicts.
Ideally, the supervision of both the town councils/municipalities and county commissioners should be through a clearly defined, non-partisan administrative and legal framework, rather than through political party affiliations.
County commissioners are typically appointed by the state or national government, making them administratively accountable to higher levels of the executive branch (e.g., state governors or the Ministry of Local Government). Their supervision should originate from these administrative hierarchies, focusing on adherence to national laws and policies, as well as the implementation of central government directives.
Town councils/municipalities, especially those with elected officials, are accountable to their local constituencies. They likely fall under the oversight of a state ministry responsible for local government. Supervision should focus on ensuring legal compliance, effective financial management, maintaining service delivery standards, and promoting democratic accountability to the local populace.
In a system prone to political instability and factionalism, establishing independent and effective oversight mechanisms is a significant challenge. An independent judiciary and robust auditing institutions would also play critical supervisory roles in ensuring legality and accountability, transcending political affiliations.
Collaboration between town councils/municipalities and county commissioners is crucial for public service delivery and requires several strategic approaches:
Clear delineation of roles and responsibilities is the most fundamental step to establishing clear legal and administrative frameworks that explicitly define the jurisdictional boundaries of each entity. This would minimize ambiguity and reduce the likelihood of conflict.
Mandatory regular coordination meetings and joint planning committees involving representatives from both the town councils/municipalities and county commissions can facilitate information sharing, joint problem-solving, and integrated service delivery planning. This would enable a more comprehensive approach to development across both urban and rural settings within a county.
Encouraging resource sharing (e.g., equipment, technical expertise) and undertaking joint projects (e.g., infrastructure development that benefits both urban and peri-urban areas) can foster cooperation and optimize the use of limited resources. This requires transparent financial management and accountability mechanisms for funds shared among stakeholders.
Engaging local communities, including traditional authorities, in planning and decision-making can help identify priorities and garner support for joint initiatives. This approach recognizes the significant role customary leaders play in local justice and conflict resolution.
Investing in training for officials in both entities, focusing on public administration, financial management, service delivery, and inter-institutional collaboration, can enhance their effectiveness and ability to work together.
Establishing formal and informal mechanisms for resolving inter-institutional disputes quickly and impartially is essential to prevent conflicts from escalating and hindering public service delivery.
Ultimately, addressing the overlap of powers requires a comprehensive approach that strengthens institutional mandates, fosters collaboration, and enhances accountability across all levels of governance in South Sudan, moving towards a more coherent and effective state.
The writer, Leek Daniel, is a media specialist and development practitioner. He can be reached via email: leek2daniel@gmail.com
The views expressed in ‘opinion’ articles published by Radio Tamazuj are solely those of the writer. The veracity of any claims made is the responsibility of the author, not Radio Tamazuj.