Weeks after Dr. Riek Machar was placed under house arrest in March 2025, reports emerged of a serious assassination plot against him. The plan was reportedly abandoned after some of President Salva Kiir’s closest allies warned that the risks were too great. International backlash, domestic unrest, retaliatory acts, and even full-scale civil war could follow. Instead, advisers proposed a quieter approach: they suggested using the justice system to permanently remove Machar from politics.
A new plot surfaced on September 23, 2025. A few days later, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-In Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) confirmed the allegations publicly in a statement, highlighting the continuing threat to Machar’s political survival.
The new plan allegedly involves President Kiir, Benjamin Bol Mel (Vice President for the Economic Cluster), Taban Deng Gai (Vice President for the Infrastructure Cluster), Ezekiel Lol Gatkuoth (former Minister of Petroleum), and certain members of the Jieng Council of Elders (JCE). According to a high-level government source who leaked information on September 16, 2025, the plot originally included a plan to shoot Machar during court proceedings, though the source did not name the plotters.
The effort to remove Machar has reportedly been underway for months. High-level meetings took place in Entebbe, Uganda, on April 2, 2025, and in Juba on May 23, 2025. Attendees included Kiir’s handpicked security officials, influential members of the JCE, and three agents from Uganda’s External Security Organisation (ESO), who arrived in Juba from Kenya that morning. According to insiders, the phrase “remove him” is attributed directly to Kiir, echoed repeatedly during the meetings. Soon afterward, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni assured Kiir that Uganda would protect his government and support efforts to neutralize Machar’s political influence.
On September 27, 2025, the top SPLM/A-IO leadership, led by Acting Chairman and Commander-in-Chief Nathaniel Oyet Pierino, confirmed to this author that the new plot against Machar is genuine. They warned of “serious consequences” if the regime threatens his life. The author is also aware that the former petroleum minister publicly denied any involvement in the plot in a social media post on the same day.
The alleged plot appears to have evolved into a two-part strategy. First, Machar is being isolated, denied access to foreign and regional leaders, limiting his ability to challenge the government’s narrative. Second, the judicial approach aims to bring him to trial on charges of treason, murder, and crimes against humanity, giving the regime a veneer of legality while stripping him of political influence. This legal approach mirrors the original assassination plan, achieving the same goal through subtler means, and it fits a broader pattern of the government’s repressive tactics.
In the minds of the regime and its supporters, the decision to target or prosecute Dr. Machar is not tribal but purely political. This claim is self-serving and driven by the regime’s fear of exposing its true intent. Those who deny this reality are the same people who promote the JCE’s tribal and destructive agenda in private while disowning it in public. Kiir’s government has long targeted the Nuer community. In December 2013, government forces and tribal militias targeted Nuer civilians in Juba. More recently, with military support from Museveni, Kiir carried out airstrikes in Nasir, Longechuk, and other Nuer-majority areas—killing scores of innocent civilians, burning villages, and uprooting families from their homes. These actions signal a systematic campaign of ethnic targeting. Uganda’s military and political backing has emboldened Kiir, giving him the confidence to pursue extreme measures with little fear of reprisal.
The people of South Sudan reject the sinister marriage between the bullying regime in Kampala—known for silencing and imprisoning opposition leaders—and the mafia-like regime in Juba, infamous for a legacy of appalling crimes; this unholy alliance is a calculated threat to the nation’s survival. It is a pact forged in oppression and corruption. Its continuation is not just unacceptable; it is an affront to justice, peace, and the very future of South Sudan. It will ignite outrage and resistance across the country. One has to wonder if Kiir and Museveni even grasp that South Sudanese and Ugandans do not share the same culture, values, or aspirations. In this reckless alliance, Kiir’s regime is both knowingly and unknowingly digging its own political grave, jeopardizing its survival with every misstep.
The regime’s tactics extend further. On April 9, 2025, a breakaway faction of the SPLM-IO led by Stephen Par Kuol emerged, claiming to support the 2018 revitalized peace agreement while accusing Machar’s loyalists of obstruction. Senior SPLM-IO officials denounced the faction as a project of the regime, reminiscent of July 2016, when Kiir installed Taban Deng Gai as the leader of the SPLM/A-IO after Machar fled Juba. The JCE, long criticized for advancing a tribal supremacy agenda, views eliminating Machar as a solution to South Sudan’s political problems.
There are undeniable realities that the people of South Sudan and the international community must understand. Removing Machar carries profound risks: he is one of the most influential South Sudanese political leaders and a key representative of the Nuer. A purge by bullet or courtroom could be seen as the culmination of years of Kiir–JCE’s political and tribal envy, potentially triggering retaliation and worsening instability in the country. In contrast, within the Nuer community, Taban Deng Gai and Ezekiel Lol are widely perceived as politicians who prioritize their own selfish interests over the needs of their constituents. Lacking solid support in their communities, their actions are seen as serving personal gain rather than the welfare of the people, deepening frustration and disillusionment.
Kiir may be underestimating the danger. History shows that leaders who believe they are untouchable—such as Idi Amin, Mobutu Sese Seko, Muammar Gaddafi, and Nicolae Ceaușescu—often fall from power when destructive policies or overreach lead to backlash. Any attempt to eliminate Machar, whether by bullet or judicial proceedings, could accelerate Kiir’s downfall.
What began as an alleged assassination plot has now transformed into a courtroom battle. Whether framed as justice, strategy, or the quiet continuation of war, the trial reflects a broader pattern. The use of politics, courts, and military backing to silence opposition has now become the official policy of Kiir’s regime. The campaign against Machar represents a coordinated effort to consolidate power, undermine peace implementation, and maintain control over South Sudan’s fragile state. The stakes could not be higher. Eliminating Riek Machar—whether politically or physically—will not resolve South Sudan’s crisis. Instead, it risks delegitimizing Kiir’s government, destabilizing the region, and provoking the very unrest the leadership seeks to avoid.
The writer, Duop Chak Wuol, is an analyst, critical writer, and former editor-in-chief of the South Sudan News Agency. He is a graduate of the University of Colorado and focuses on geopolitics, security, and social issues in South Sudan and the broader East African region. His work has appeared in leading regional and international outlets, including AllAfrica, Radio Tamazuj, The Independent (Uganda), The Arab Weekly, The Standard (Kenya), The Chronicle (Ghana), Addis Standard (Ethiopia), and Sudan Tribune. In August 2017, the Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation highlighted his article on Prime Minister Meles Zenawi’s role in Ethiopia’s economic transformation. He currently focuses on emerging security dynamics, including tensions over the Nile waters and foreign involvement in conflicts in South Sudan and Sudan. He can be reached at duop282@gmail.com.
The views expressed in ‘opinion’ articles published by Radio Tamazuj are solely those of the writer. The veracity of any claims made is the responsibility of the author, not Radio Tamazuj.