South Sudan’s political crisis cannot be resolved by dissolving the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGoNU), establishing a caretaker administration, or changing the electoral legal framework while leaving the substantive obligations of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) unfulfilled. Such measures may change the appearance of government without addressing the political, constitutional, security and economic structures responsible for the country’s persistent instability.
In responding to four reasons put forward by Mr. Mogga in his arguments for dissolving the transitional government, which include, first, to bring the existing transitional government to an institutional end; second, to start a new journey through a caretaker administration; third, to pave the way for elections by changing the legal framework; and fourth, to end the concentration of executive authority amid financial uncertainty, I would like to say that these are not the reasons. Rather, they are effects of a prolonged transitional period without accountability.
I think Mr. Mogga, in writing the article, did not pay attention to the fundamental distinction between ending the transition administratively and completing it constitutionally, institutionally, and democratically. What he was supposed to look into critically is the way the R-ARCSS was designed. It was designed to guide South Sudan from armed conflict and concentrated executive authority towards inclusive governance, a unified professional security sector, an accountable public finance sector, transitional justice, a permanent constitution, and credible elections. Therefore, ending the transition without these issues in place is a mere wild goose chase. In other words, dissolution alone cannot deliver these outcomes, and without these issues in place, the future of South Sudan is in limbo.
Dissolution and a caretaker government are not substitutes for reform
Mr. Mogga’s concerns about ineffective governance, delayed elections, concentrated executive authority, and financial uncertainty that make him support the dissolution reflect genuine challenges facing South Sudan. However, dissolving the R-TGoNU, destroying the R-ARCSS, and going for premature elections without implementing the R-ARCSS in letter and spirit is putting the cart before the horse. The issues the R-ARCSS was designed to address cannot be addressed through elections. A caretaker administration may maintain essential public services, but it cannot substitute for implementing the political and institutional reforms prescribed by the R-ARCSS.
Without clear constitutional authority, effective oversight and enforceable accountability, a new administration could reproduce the same concentration of power under a different name. The relevant question is therefore not simply whether the existing government should continue, but whether the country has fulfilled the substantive obligations necessary to move beyond the transitional order. Replacing the government without completing those obligations risks perpetuating the crisis rather than resolving it.
Elections must follow credible preparations, not replace them
It is important to remind Mr. Mogga that elections are an essential outcome of the transition, not an alternative to implementing the peace agreement. Credible elections require an independent electoral administration, reliable voter registration, adequate funding, political freedoms, security guarantees, a functioning judiciary, and meaningful participation by eligible citizens, including refugees and internally displaced persons.
They also require an agreed and legitimate constitutional framework and public confidence in the electoral process. Merely changing electoral laws, shortening preparations or announcing a polling date cannot compensate for deficiencies in these essential conditions. An election conducted without adequate safeguards risks turning unresolved political and security disputes into a contest for control of an unreformed state. The objective must therefore be elections that are peaceful, inclusive, free, fair and credible, not elections conducted simply to declare the transition complete.
Five structural reforms that made the SPLM-IG carry out a bureaucratic coup
It is important to draw to the attention of Mr. Mogga that the dissolution was not legal, but it was a bureaucratic coup. This is a type of coup that occurs when non-elected civil servants or administrative officials quietly seize, retain, or override power through rules, executive manoeuvring, or withholding institutional support rather than military force. The SPLM-IG dissolved the R-TGoNU because the implementation of the R-ARCSS has consequences for the distribution and exercise of political power. Therefore, the following five reasons can explain the occurrence of the said coup:
First, power-sharing and executive accountability. Chapter I establishes an inclusive governance framework intended to constrain unilateral decision-making. Genuine implementation requires consultation, negotiated governance, and respect for the participation of the agreement’s signatories. This forced President Kiir to dissolve the R-TGoNU because it is weakening his grip on power.
Second, security-sector unification. Chapter II provides for transitional security arrangements aimed at establishing a unified, professional, and accountable national security sector. This process requires moving away from fragmented military structures and armed political leverage towards institutions governed by law. President Kiir and the SPLM-IG fear security arrangements because they do not want to lose political leverage that is achieved through control over the fragmented security sector.
Third, inclusive electoral participation. Reliable population data, credible voter registration, and appropriate arrangements for refugees and internally displaced persons are essential to electoral legitimacy. Uncertainty surrounding these processes can create opportunities for manipulation where independent oversight is weak. This is what President Kiir wants so that he can hold elections that he can manipulate and rig.
Fourth, transparency in public finances and oil revenues. Chapter IV addresses resource, economic, and financial management. Effective implementation would have strengthened public accountability, transparent resource allocation, and independent oversight. This was what the SPLM-IG and President Kiir feared, as implementing the R-ARCSS had implications of losing control over public finances.
Fifth, transitional justice and constitutional reform. Chapter V provides for transitional justice mechanisms, including the Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing, the Hybrid Court for South Sudan and the Compensation and Reparation Authority. Their effective operation is essential to accountability, reconciliation and redress. Chapter VI and the wider constitutional process are equally important for establishing permanent constitutional safeguards, protecting fundamental rights and ensuring that public authority is exercised within the law.
These reforms may challenge entrenched interests, but their purpose is not to punish a political party. It is to establish institutions capable of serving citizens, holding leaders accountable, and outlasting individual administrations. These are issues that the SPLM-IG and President Kiir fear the most, and this is one of the reasons that made President Kiir and the SPLM-IG dissolve the R-TGoNU.
The Tumaini Initiative must complement, not undermine, the peace framework
I have seen in several comments from some writers trying to invoke the Tumaini Peace Initiative as the replacement of R-ARCSS, which Mogga emphasised in his article. I would like to caution him and the rest that the relationship between the Tumaini Peace Initiative and the R-ARCSS raises important questions about legal continuity, political inclusion and the authority of the existing peace agreement. A supplementary initiative may help engage holdout groups and resolve outstanding issues, but its legitimacy depends on its consistency with the established framework and the applicable procedures for changing agreed arrangements.
Parallel processes that bypass relevant parties, create competing institutions, or weaken existing commitments risk producing legal uncertainty rather than lasting peace. Dialogue must not become a substitute for implementing obligations already agreed upon. The proper test is whether any new initiative strengthens the R-ARCSS, broadens meaningful participation, and advances enforceable reforms. Changing the name of a peace process or creating another administrative structure cannot, by itself, resolve the underlying causes of conflict.
The destination must be a permanent constitutional state
South Sudan needs an inclusive constitutional settlement that ends the cycle of provisional political arrangements. A permanent constitution should define the distribution of public powers, protect fundamental rights, establish effective checks and balances, and provide independent judicial and constitutional oversight. The process should consider an appropriate federal system based on territorial arrangements and fiscal accountability, alongside professional security institutions, credible elections, transparent public finance, and accessible justice mechanisms.
Transitional justice must address past violations through lawful and independent processes, while reconciliation and reparation should contribute to rebuilding public trust. These are not optional additions to the transition. They are essential foundations of sustainable peace and democratic government.
Conclusion
Mr. Mogga’s concerns about governance, elections, executive power, and financial uncertainty deserve examination. However, dissolving the transitional government cannot, by itself, correct the institutional weaknesses that have prolonged South Sudan’s transition. A caretaker administration without enforceable safeguards may simply inherit the same problems, while elections without adequate constitutional, security, and institutional preparations may deepen political disputes.
The priority must be to implement the R-ARCSS in letter and spirit, establish accountable institutions, unify the security sector, strengthen public financial management, advance transitional justice, and complete an inclusive constitutional process. South Sudan does not need merely to end the transition administratively; it needs to complete it constitutionally, institutionally and democratically. Ending a government on paper while leaving the causes of the crisis intact is not a solution; it is the risk of beginning another cycle of political uncertainty under a different name.
The writer is a South Sudanese constitutional lawyer, academic, and political figure. He studied law at Makerere University in Kampala, Uganda. He is an independent legal researcher and constitutional expert and serves as a lecturer and Deputy Dean of the College of Law at Starford International University in Juba. He is also a member of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO). He can be reached via nhomngekjuol@gmail.com.
The views expressed in ‘opinion’ articles published by Radio Tamazuj are solely those of the writer. The veracity of any claims made is the responsibility of the author, not Radio Tamazuj.
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