Israel’s recent decision to become the first country to recognize Somaliland as an independent state is a move that carries profound geopolitical and strategic implications for the Horn of Africa and the broader Middle East. At first glance, the announcement may appear as a routine diplomatic gesture. A closer look, however, reveals a highly calculated strategy aimed at exploiting existing regional rivalries while positioning Israel as a key player in Horn of Africa geopolitics.
Strategically, Israel’s move directly intersects with ongoing rivalries among Arab states. Historically, Egypt and Saudi Arabia have sought to exert influence over the Horn of Africa, including Somalia, Djibouti, Sudan, and Eritrea, often positioning themselves against a bloc led by the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, whose influence in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden corridor has grown over the last decade. By recognizing Somaliland, Israel effectively signals alignment with specific Gulf actors while subtly challenging the influence of others, particularly Cairo and Riyadh, whose interests remain tied to Somalia’s territorial integrity.
Somaliland, which has been self-governing since 1991, has never been internationally recognized, despite maintaining a stable political system, effective security forces, and a functioning economy. Therefore, Israel’s decision does more than grant diplomatic recognition. It legitimizes a self-governing entity that has long existed in a legal gray zone, potentially encouraging other countries to recalibrate their diplomatic approaches toward the Horn. This move also provides Israel with strategic leverage over the vital Bab el-Mandeb Strait and Red Sea shipping lanes, a corridor of growing geopolitical importance, particularly as maritime security concerns intensify.
Israel’s decision can be read as a continuation of its broader regional strategy, cultivating partnerships that expand its influence while carefully avoiding direct confrontation with major Arab powers. By positioning itself as an early supporter of Somaliland, Israel can secure footholds in ports, infrastructure projects, and intelligence-sharing arrangements without immediately provoking a unified Arab response. In effect, Israel is leveraging pre-existing rivalries to advance its strategic interests, a tactic reminiscent of how other external powers have historically navigated Horn of Africa politics.
The decision, however, is unlikely to be without consequences. Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which have historically viewed the Horn of Africa as within their sphere of influence, may perceive this as an affront, potentially straining relations with Israel. Addis Ababa is a key stakeholder; Ethiopia maintains strategic partnerships with both Somaliland and Somalia, and Israel’s move could complicate its relations with Mogadishu. Somalia, for its part, has already condemned the decision, asserting that it undermines its sovereignty and risks destabilizing the region.
Yet framing these potential reactions as convergent or coordinated risks obscuring deeper structural realities. Assuming that Egypt and Ethiopia would naturally align in opposing Israel’s recognition of Somaliland ignores a more fundamental fact. Cairo and Addis Ababa are strategic adversaries locked in an unresolved and deeply antagonistic conflict over Nile waters—a tension intensified by the completion of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) in September 2025. The GERD’s completion has entrenched Ethiopia’s upstream leverage and transformed its relationship with Egypt into one defined by zero-sum calculations, deep mistrust, and sustained diplomatic confrontation, making coordinated policy between the two states highly unlikely.
Amid these dynamics, Ethiopia’s position on Somaliland is neither ambiguous nor accidental. Addis Ababa and Somaliland signed a Memorandum of Understanding in January 2024, granting Ethiopia access to the Red Sea, signaling a shared strategic trajectory that remains largely intact despite mounting external pressure. Egypt, by contrast, has pursued a deliberate strategy of regional encirclement, forging strong political and security ties with Somalia, Eritrea, and Sudan as a means of constraining Ethiopian influence and reinforcing its claimed “historic rights” over Nile waters—claims rooted in the colonial-era 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and the 1959 amendment that excluded upstream nations. Cairo has complemented this approach with more limited engagement with Uganda and South Sudan, further underscoring its effort to shape the Nile Basin’s political environment. Under these conditions, it is analytically unsound to presume that Ethiopia and Egypt would respond similarly to Israel’s recognition of Somaliland; their divergent interests, alliances, and existential priorities virtually guarantee opposing strategic calculations.
A similar logic helps explain why Israel’s recognition of Somaliland could gain traction rather than collapse under regional pushback. The rivalry between Egypt and the United Arab Emirates—often obscured by surface-level coordination—has become increasingly visible in Sudan’s ongoing civil war. Abu Dhabi has been widely reported to support the Rapid Support Forces, while Cairo remains firmly aligned with the Sudanese Armed Forces.
This divergence reflects competing visions for influence along the Red Sea corridor and across the Nile Basin. When read alongside the Ethiopia–Egypt rivalry over the GERD, a clear pattern emerges: Egypt is strategically overstretched and regionally overextended, confronting Ethiopia and the UAE across multiple theaters.
Israel’s move on Somaliland exploits this fragmentation, operating in a geopolitical environment where Arab consensus is fractured, and Cairo lacks the leverage to mobilize a unified response. Given these circumstances, Somaliland’s recognition appears less as a provocation and more as a calculated bet that rivalry—rather than solidarity—will define regional reactions.
Is there any state that genuinely believes Israel—under its current administration, having already weighed the strategic costs, anticipated diplomatic backlash, and acted within a regional environment defined more by fragmentation than cohesion—would realistically reverse its recognition of Somaliland even in the hypothetical face of a unified and forceful Arab, Western, or African opposition, when such unity itself is highly improbable and the decision so clearly aligns with Israel’s long-term security and strategic interests?
While a definitive answer may be difficult to establish, the probability of such a reversal appears exceedingly low, and readers are encouraged to draw their own conclusions based on the strategic realities outlined above.
From a moral and normative perspective, Israel’s decision raises questions about the principles underpinning statehood and self-determination. Somaliland’s record of internal governance, relative stability, and democratic practice distinguishes it from much of the region and has attracted interest from states that emphasize liberal institutional norms. Yet bypassing international consensus—particularly the United Nations’ position recognizing Somaliland as part of Somalia—introduces a tension between strategic pragmatism and established principles of international law. Israel’s maneuver underscores a broader trend in which geopolitical calculations increasingly shape the norms of international legitimacy, often at the expense of multilateral legal frameworks.
The broader implications extend beyond the Horn of Africa. Israel’s move may prompt other countries to reconsider their positions on Somaliland, potentially triggering a cascade of diplomatic realignments. It could also intensify competition among Gulf Arab states and force Cairo and Riyadh to reassess their strategies in East Africa. For Israel, this represents a calculated gamble: the potential gains in influence, access, and strategic depth must be weighed against the risk of alienating long-standing partners and triggering unintended diplomatic fallout.
Israel’s acknowledgment of Somaliland demonstrates that diplomacy in the Horn of Africa is no longer a matter of routine formality. It has become a strategically charged arena of influence and maneuvering. The outcome of this move—whether it proves to be a masterful strategic maneuver or a perilous overreach—will depend on how regional actors, particularly Egypt, Ethiopia, the Gulf states, and Somalia, respond to the evolving balance of power. Israel has now placed a high-stakes test before the international community, removing diplomatic ambiguity and compelling decisive action. How other states choose to uphold inherited orthodoxies or adapt to the region’s shifting strategic dynamics will shape the Horn of Africa’s next geopolitical chapter.
The writer, Duop Chak Wuol, is an analyst, critical writer, and former editor-in-chief of the South Sudan News Agency. He is a graduate of the University of Colorado and focuses on geopolitics, security, and social issues in South Sudan and the broader East African region. His work has appeared in leading regional and international outlets, including AllAfrica, Radio Tamazuj, The Independent (Uganda), The Arab Weekly, The Standard (Kenya), The Chronicle (Ghana), Addis Standard (Ethiopia), and Sudan Tribune. In 2017, the Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation (EBC) highlighted his article on Prime Minister Meles Zenawi’s role in Ethiopia’s economic transformation. He can be reached at duop282@gmail.com.
The views expressed in ‘opinion’ articles published by Radio Tamazuj are solely those of the writer. The veracity of any claims made is the responsibility of the author, not Radio Tamazuj.